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 Sharia Supervisory Boards, Governance Structures and Operational Risk Disclosures: 
Evidence from Islamic Banks in MENA Countries 
 
Abstract  
This paper examines the impact of Sharia supervisory board (SSB) and governance structures 
on the extent of operational risk disclosures (ORDs), using a sample of 63 Islamic banks from 
10 (i.e., Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the 
UAE) countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region for the fiscal years 2006 
to 2013. Drawing on Sharia compliance, Islamic banking and corporate governance literature, 
our findings are as follows. We find that SSB, block ownership, board independence, and 
country-level governance quality are statistically significant and positively associated with 
ORDs. Our results are robust when controlling for several bank- and country-level variables. 
Our study has implications for policy-makers and regulators in the MENA region with respect 
to the development and implementation of SSB and governance mechanisms that can improve 
operational risk disclosures. Finally, the findings highlight the need to enhance current 
understanding of SSB structures and governance mechanisms that can best help Islamic banks 
towards engaging in effective compliance with recent governance and accounting reforms. 
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The observable weaknesses in operational risk management and disclosure practices, as well 
as corporate governance (CG) structures in the wake of the financial crisis have reignited the 
debate relating to the importance of managing operational risk within the banking sector 
worldwide (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2014; Elamer et al., 2019). Similarly, previous 
studies that have examined the failure of many conventional banks (e.g., RBS), as well as 
Islamic banks (IBs) (e.g., the Dubai Islamic Bank) have identified weaknesses in CG, risk 
management, and disclosure practices, as potential drivers of the recent global banking crisis 
(BCBS, 2014, 2014d; Elamer et al., 2018; Elamer & Benyazid, 2018; Ntim et al., 2013). 
Meanwhile, a good number of past studies have explored a number issues in IBs, including (i) 
performance of IBs in comparison with their conventional counterparts (e.g., Mallin et al., 
2014); (ii) CG and performance (e.g., Mollah & Zaman, 2015); (iii) CSR, ethics and 
performance (e.g., Farook et al., 2011; Mallin et al., 2014); (iv) voluntary disclosure (e.g., AI-
Bassam & Ntim, 2016; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007), and normative and critical evaluations (e.g., 
Safieddine, 2009), among others. However, and notwithstanding its importance, prior studies 
investigating the association between CG and operational risk disclosures (ORDs) within banks 
generally, and in Islamic banks, in particular, are rare (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013).  
More importantly, prior literature has not examined the crucial question of how Sharia 
supervisory boards (SSBs), other bank-level governance mechanisms, and country-level 
governance structures may influence ORDs of IBs. Therefore, this paper explores the impact of 
these three types of governance structures on ORDs of IBs using a natural and unique corporate 
setting in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, where recent CG and regulatory 
reforms, including the implementation of the Basel accords (e.g., I, II and III), IAS 32 and 39, 
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as well as IFRS 7 and 9 in particular, require banks to provide more transparent information 
about their operational risk practices (Bischof, 2009). 
Generally, IBs may engage in comprehensive ORDs for a number of theoretical reasons. First, 
agency theory suggests that effective and transparent ORDs can mitigate agency costs between 
insiders (management) and shareholders, and thus impact positively on the performance of IBs 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Second, signalling theory predicts that IBs communicate 
operational risk information to outsiders in order to signal to potential investors the banks’ 
apparent sound operational risk management practices and performance, and hence reducing 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders (Connelly et al., 2011). Third, from the 
legitimacy theory stance, engaging in increased ORDs, including those relating to Sharia, can 
be considered a strategic way in which IBs can legitimise their operations and gain acceptance 
within the broader society (Connelly et al., 2011). Fourth, resource dependence theory predicts 
that increased ORDs can help in granting IBs access to essential resources, such as finance and 
contracts that can facilitate their long-term survival (Elamer et al., 2019; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
2003). 
Accordingly, previous studies have concentrated on the incentives of, and explanations for, the 
incidence and amount of ORDs. For instance, Barakat and Hussainey (2013) examined the 
connections among CG, regulatory quality and ORDs in European banks. They argue that 
banks characterised by a greater percentage of NEDs, fewer executive shareholding and 
concentrated private shareholding offer greater ORDs. Relatedly, Abdallah et al. (2015) argue 
that Islamic financial institutions disclose fewer risks than those of non-Islamic financial 
institutions because they are inherently conservative institutions, when it comes to risk. 
Additionally, Izhar and Asutay (2010) argue that operational risks (e.g., Sharia incompliance 
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risk) are considered the second most important risks in IBs after credit risk. Nevertheless, prior 
studies arguably suffer from a number of limitations.  
First, prior studies examining the nature and determinants of ORDs in IBs are either limited or 
qualitative in nature (Abdallah et al., 2015). Second, prior studies which address ORDs have 
mostly been done in developed countries (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Helbok & Wagner, 
2006) and cross-country studies are notably scarce (Abdallah et al., 2015). Third, to the best of 
our knowledge, there is no evidence on whether and, if so, how Islamic governance and 
country-level governance qualities are associated with ORDs in different regulatory 
environments, particularly within MENA IBs. Of a direct relevance to our current study, 
however, is Neifar and Jarboui (2018). Using data from 34 Islamic banks from Asia over a period 
from 2008 to 2014, Neifar and Jarboui (2018) found that independent directors and ownership 
concentration have a positive impact on operational risk disclosure. Conversely, they found 
that CEO duality and SSB have a negative relationship with operational risk disclosure. 
However, Neifar and Jarboui (2018) suffer from a number of limitations. First, their sample is from 
different countries (Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and Iran) with different economic, political and social 
backgrounds, but we have carefully chosen a homogenous sample from MENA countries. In addition, 
they failed to control for potential country-level differences by including country level variables, such 
as country-level governance and corruptions that can arguably affect the levels of operational risk 
disclosures. Finally, they used the mere presence of a SSB as a proxy for Islamic governance. We extend 
and complement this line of research by considering several governance attributes by (i) expanding our 
sample from 34 to 63 IBs from a fairly homogenous economic, geographical and political areas; (ii) 
adding country-level governance quality variable in addition to other country-level control variables, as 
unique variables to explain the key differences among the different countries sampled. Against this 
background, we contend that the level and extent of ORDs can be expected to differ from those 
of conventional banks. As such, studying the ORDs in IBs, where empirical findings are rare, 
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can contribute towards improving current knowledge and understanding of the motives and 
determinants of good ORD practices. 
Consequently, the current study seeks to extend, as well as make a number of new contributions 
to the existing literature by addressing several of the articulated limitations of previous studies. 
First, we provide evidence on the level of ORDs in IBs in 10 MENA countries. Second, we 
provide evidence for the first time on the effect of SSB on the level of ORDs in IBs. Third, we 
offer new evidence on the impact of other bank-level and country-level governance structures 
on the level of ORDs in IBs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first cross-country 
analysis of ORDs, SSB, and other governance structures in IBs that cover both the pre- and 
post-2007/08 financial crisis periods to-date. Finally, this paper examines the factors that drive 
ORDs from a multi-theoretical perspective. Given the different incentives for IBs in engaging 
in ORDs, the current study is different from prior literature by its ex-ante investigation of ORDs 
from multiple theoretical perspectives, consisting of agency, signalling, legitimacy, and 
resource dependence theories, as providing the possible basis for understanding and clarifying 
ORDs in IBs operating in MENA countries. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of 
operational risk disclosures in MENA IBs. The following section presents the literature review 
and hypotheses development. The remaining sections outline the research design, report 
empirical analyses and provide a conclusion. 
2. Operational Risk Disclosures in MENA Islamic Banks 
MENA countries share similar political and socio-economic characteristics, including, but not 
limited to concentration of ownership, a growing reputation for Islamic banking and finance, 
weak governance structures, and poor disclosure practices, as shown in Table 1 (Alshbili et al., 
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2019; Distinguin et al., 2010; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007). Similarly, the Islamic banking and 
finance sector has witnessed significant growth in the past three decades, especially in the 
MENA region. According to the S&P (2016) and Global Islamic Finance Report (2017) 
relating to IBs, the Islamic banking and finance industry is worth about US$2.293 trillion at 
the end of December 2016, representing an annual growth rate of about 10%. Further, IBs 
control over 51.2%, 45.2% and 29.3% of the market share in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and 
Bahrain, respectively, as well as penetrating new markets in Africa, Asia and Europe. For 
example, it has been predicted that IBs will be able to raise about US$6.7 trillion by 2020 (Ernst 
& Young, 2016; S&P, 2016). 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Notwithstanding this phenomenal growth, IBs are dominated by risk. A major reason for the 
high levels of risk consciousness in IBs is that they need to operate in a Sharia-compliant 
manner often with the approval of a SSB in every aspect of their operations in addition to the 
traditional risks that they bear as conventional commercial banks. It should be noted that 
operating in a Sharia-compliant manner, includes, but not limited to the prohibition of interest 
(‘RIBA’) and speculative activities, and restriction to Islamically acceptable deals and profit-
sharing models (Mollah & Zaman, 2015), among others. Therefore, SSBs can serve as an 
important CG mechanism, which can offer legitimacy and credibility to the operations of IBs 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007).  
Operational risks in IBs have also become more complex due to the growing financial and 
technological complexity, large-scale acquisitions and mergers, new business activities, 
globalisation, and regulations, such as the Basel Accords (BCBS, 2003). With specific 
reference to the Basel Accords and unlike Basel I, Basel II requires banks to measure, allocate 
and disclose operational risks (BCBS, 2006). In this case, Basel II defines operational risks, as 
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“the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or 
from external events” (BCBS, 2006, p.144). More importantly, the third Pillar (market 
discipline) of Basel II sets disclosure requirements to evaluate key operational risk information 
regarding the scope of application, risk exposures, risk appetite framework, risk assessment 
processes, and operational risk capital adequacy (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Iren et al., 2014).  
It is worth noting that the Basel II Accord proposed qualitative and quantitative operational 
risks disclosures regarding strategies, processes, structures and nature of the operational risks 
used by banks, in addition to operational risk methods that can be used to calculate the 
minimum capital adequacy requirements. Principally, the Basel II Accord required a qualitative 
operational risk disclosure that contains (i) operational risk measurement approach, (ii) 
operational risk management strategies and processes, (iii) operational risk management 
functional structure and organisation, and (iv) scope and nature of the operational risk reporting 
system (BCBS, 2006, 2014). The Basel II Accord also expected a quantitative operational risk 
disclosure that contains operational risk exposure, and the amount of regulatory capital for 
operational risk (Pillar 1 capital) (BCBS, 2006). Along with the Basel II requirement, similar 
risk disclosure issues have been addressed by IFRSs 7 and 9, in addition to IASs 32 and 39 
(Bischof, 2009). For instance, IFRS 7 requires qualitative and quantitative disclosures relating 
to risks arising from financial instruments (Bischof, 2009). However, there are no formal 
granularity within operational risks reporting requirements that are currently in existence 
(BCBS, 2016). It should also be noted that Basel II Accord is not compulsory for all banks in 
the MENA region, as shown in Table 2. However, banks in many countries, such as Saudi 
Arabia, are required to fully comply with Basel II and III (BCBS, 2015a).  
Currently, many Islamic banks are reconsidering their operational risks and their governance 
practices (BCBS, 2014; Izhar & Asutay, 2010; Young, 2015). Thus, we analyse operational 
9 
 
risk disclosure drivers because IBs had a substantial degree of freedom regarding operational 
risk disclosure, as discussed above. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Furthermore, Islamic banks in MENA face a unique challenge in managing their risks, due to 
the continual political turbulence, distinctive asset and liability structures, and Islamic 
compliance, which conventional banks are not exposed to (Abedifar et al., 2013; Mokni et al., 
2014; Mollah & Zaman, 2015). Additionally, the need to comply with Islamic governance rules 
and regulations poses stronger operational risk management challenges compared to their 
conventional counterparts (Abedifar et al., 2013; Izhar & Asutay, 2010; Mokni et al., 2014).  
Thus and due to the apparent special nature of IBs, Sharia risk arguably emerges as the main 
operational risk, particularly if IBs were to operate in a manner that is non-compliant with 
Sharia law and, therefore, an inherent theoretical expectation arises that IBs might be willing 
to voluntarily disclose more operational risk information relating to their Sharia compliance 
activities compared to their conventional counterparts (Safieddine, 2009). That is, the religious 
features of Islamic banks create additional operational risks in terms of Sharia non-compliance 
risk (Abedifar et al., 2013; Izhar & Asutay, 2010; Van Greuning & Iqbal, 2007). Thus, the 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) defines operational risks in Islamic banks as, “the risk 
of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and system, or from 
external events, which includes, but is not limited to, legal risk and Sharia non-compliance 
risk” (IFSB, 2005, p. 26). Sharia non-compliance risk is a distinctive and significant aspect of 
Islamic banks rising from Islamic bank failure to comply with Sharia rules and principles 
governed by the relevant Sharia body in the jurisdiction, which can have a negative effect on 
bank income (IFSB, 2005; Izhar & Asutay, 2010). In summary, it could be argued that Islamic 
banks face three main operational risks, (i) Sharia non-compliance risk that is a unique risk, 
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(ii) general risks which result from regular banking activities, and (iii) legal risks that are 
generally similar to, but are not necessarily limited to, those exposed to by their conventional 
counterparts (IFSB, 2005; Izhar & Asutay, 2010; Van Greuning & Iqbal, 2007). Thus, we 
conjecture that the antecedents of ORDs in IBs can be expected to differ from those of 
conventional counterparts. As such, studying the ORDs in IBs, where empirical findings are 
rare, can contribute to current knowledge and understanding of the motives and determinants 
of ORDs’ practices. 
3. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Previous studies (e.g., Abdallah et al., 2015; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Helbok & Wagner, 
2006) have identified a number of factors that can drive general voluntary disclosures, 
including ORDs. Therefore and distinguishing the current study from most previous studies, 
we investigate how SSBs influence ORDs. We also examine how bank-level CG mechanisms 
in the form of block shareholding, board size, and NEDs, as well as country-level governance 
mechanisms drive ORDs in MENA IBs.  
3.1. Islamic Governance (SSB) and ORDs 
Islamic governance in the form of the SSB is an important internal CG mechanism assuring 
Sharia compliance, which is rooted in Sharia principles and rules. Theoretically, agency theory 
suggests that effective SSB can mitigate agency conflicts and information asymmetry between 
insiders (management) and shareholders by providing fruitful and independent supervision 
regarding Sharia-compliant products and operations (Safieddine, 2009). Second, signalling and 
legitimacy theories predict that independent SSB with wide expertise and knowledge can help 
legitimise IBs’ operations by securing the approval of the broader society through its 
encouragement of mangers of IBs to engage in increased ORDs (Connelly et al., 2011). Finally, 
resource dependence theory predicts that SSB can help in granting IBs access to essential 
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resources by enhancing ORDs by managers of IBs (Ntim et al., 2013; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
2003). 
Empirically, Farook et al. (2011), Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) and Rahman and Bukair (2013) 
examine the drivers of IBs’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures, and find that the 
SSB characteristics (proxies by the SSB existence, SSB members, SSB members’ doctoral 
education, cross-memberships, and respectable scholars as members of SSBs) positively 
impact the level of CSR disclosure. Mallin et al. (2014) also examine the relationship between 
SSB and CSR disclosure using a sample of 90 Islamic banks from 2010 to 2011 across 13 
countries. They find a positive relationship between SSB size and CSR disclosure, which 
highlights the important role of the SSB in supporting IBs’ social disclosure. Abdullah et al. 
(2013) examine the impact of SSB on CG disclosure and quality of financial reporting, 
respectively. They find a positive impact of SSB on corporate governance disclosure and 
financial reporting quality, respectively. Finally, using a sample of 75 Saudi listed firms from 
2004 to 2010, AI-Bassam and Ntim (2016) report that Islamic values incorporating SSB have 
a positive impact on the level of voluntary CG disclosures. Noticeably, and to the best of our 
knowledge, there is one study that has examined the impact of SSB on ORDs. Neifar and Jarboui 
(2018) found that the presence of a SSB has a negative impact on operational risk disclosure, 
which contradict the above studies. We, therefore, seek to contribute to the existing literature 
by examining the effect of SSB on ORDs. Specifically, we innovatively employ a number of 
SSB characteristics (i.e. SSB existence, SSB members, and SSB meetings), which reflect SSB 
quality based on IFSB guidelines (IFSB, 2005) and past studies, as shown in Appendix B. 
Therefore, the study hypothesises that:  
H1: There is a positive link between SSB characteristics (i.e., SSB existence, SSB members, and 




3.2. Ownership Structure, Board Mechanisms, and ORDs 
Ownership structure has been suggested as a main driver of ORDs. Theoretically, ownership 
concentration in terms of block ownership can affect ORDs in two ways. On the one hand, 
agency theory predicts that block shareholders face less agency conflict, as they can obtain 
direct access to vital information, and so we can expect fewer ORDs in IBs with high levels of 
block shareholding. In contrast, signalling, legitimacy, and resource dependence theories 
expect that block shareholders may enhance ORDs to send signals to the external environment 
about a bank’s prudent risk management practices as a way of securing vital resources, as well 
as legitimising its operations, and thereby gaining public trust.  
Empirically, Zouari and Taktak (2014) document that more than 70% of IBs ownership is 
controlled by the highest 5 owners. A number of previous research in developing countries 
support agency they and provide an evidence that there is a negative relationship between block 
ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Htay, 2012). In IBs 
context, Grassa and Chakroun (2016) document that voluntary disclosure (i.e., corporate 
governance disclosure) is negatively related to block ownership in GCC banks. Also, Albassam 
and Ntim (2017), Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) and Ntim et al. (2013) find a negative 
relationship between block ownership and the level of risk disclosure in large listed non-
financial firms. By contrast, O’Sullivan et al. (2008) find no association between block 
ownership and level of risk disclosure in large listed non-financial firms. Finally, the findings 
of other past studies such as Grassa et al. (2018) and Neifar and Jarboui (2018) found that 
ownership concentration has a positive impact on Islamic banks (IBs) product and services 
disclosure, and operational risk disclosure in a sample of IBs, respectively. We follow the main 
literature that found a negative relation between block ownership and level of risk disclosure 
and therefore, our study sets the following hypothesis, which states that: 
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H2: There is a significant negative link between block ownership and the level of ORDs in 
MENA Islamic banks.  
Board structure provides another significant dimension which, alongside bank ownership, may 
have a profound effect on ORDs. Specifically, BCBS (2003, 2014), and IFSB (2005) 
demonstrate the importance of board of directors in reviewing and approving the operational 
risk management objectives, policies, strategies and processes that are consistent with the IBs’ 
risk culture and risk tolerance, and with sound principles of operational risks. Agency theory 
predicts that larger and independent boards with great in-depth knowledge can increase 
managerial monitoring and may reduce information asymmetry by enhancing ORDs. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) find that bigger boards improve the monitoring role of directors, with 
more qualified and experienced members. Thus, a strong board of directors can increase a 
firm’s value by enhancing ORDs. Signalling, legitimacy, and resource dependence theories 
expect that larger and independent boards may enhance ORDs to send a signal to the external 
environment about a bank’s performance, and thereby securing vital resources as well as 
legitimising their operations by gaining public trust. By contrast, other studies suggest that 
bigger boards may lead to slow decision making, more conflict and time-wasting (e.g., Fama 
& Jensen, 1985; Jensen, 1993), which may affect ORDs negatively. 
Empirically, Alnabsha et al. (2018), Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) and Ntim et al. (2013; 2016) 
find a significant positive association between board size and the level of disclosure. In 
contrast, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) find an insignificant association between board size and 
the level of disclosure. Finally, Domínguez and Gámez (2014) show a negative relation 
between board size and risk disclosure using a sample from the Spanish context. However, all 
these studies focus on non-financial firms, thereby limiting current understanding of this 
relationship in banks in general, but IBs in particular. Thus, we hypothesise:  
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H3: There is a significant positive link between board size and the level of ORDs in MENA 
Islamic banks.  
Board independence has been suggested as a key determinant of ORDs. Specifically, a number 
of corporate governance codes (e.g., EIoD, 2016; OCED, 2015) and sound principles of 
corporate governance and operational risks (BCBS, 2011, 2014) demonstrate the importance 
of board independence. Agency theory predicts that independent boards with great experience 
and knowledge can enhance monitoring and reduce information asymmetry through their 
ability to encourage managers to engage in increased ORDs.  Barakat and Hussainey (2013) 
find that independent boards have a positive effect on ORDs. Signalling, legitimacy, and 
resource dependence theories suggest that independent boards may enhance ORDs by sending 
a signal to the external environment about bank performance. ORDs may also help to secure 
vital resources as well as legitimise IBs’ operations and gain public trust.  
Empirically, a number of studies suggest that board independence (i.e., NEDs) may improve 
the level of ORDs (e.g., Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Mallin et al., 2014). In contrast, a few 
studies suggest a non-significant relationship between board independence and ORDs (Barakat 
& Hussainey, 2013), but none of these studies has examined such a relationship in banks or 
IBs. This provides a unique opportunity to contribute to the extant literature and, thus, we 
hypothesise that:  
H4: There is a significant positive link between NEDs and the level of ORDs in MENA Islamic 
banks.  
 
3.3. Country-level Governance and ORDs 
Recently, many MENA countries have pursued new regulatory reforms in order to enhance 
investor protection and increase corporate transparency. Specifically many countries, such as 
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Saudi Arabia, have adopted Basel Accords, International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), and corporate governance codes. However, the impact of country governance quality 
on banks’ operational disclosure levels remains largely unexplored. Agency theory, on the one 
hand, predicts that countries with good governance institutions may mitigate agency conflicts 
through enhanced minority rights and increased information transparency via high ORDs. In 
other words, strong country governance arrangements may encourage managers to provide 
more ORDs because they may restrict managers’ ability to behave opportunistically, and thus 
help alleviate the incentives of those managers to provide less ORDs to the banks’ stakeholders 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013). On the other hand, it can be 
argued that country-level governance practices may serve a monitoring role in weak corporate 
governance environments compared to the case in their strong counterparts. Specifically, weak 
country governance environments often lead to increased agency costs; and thereby, banks may 
need to improve their firm-level governance in the form of increased ORDs; and vice-versa. 
Similarly, IBs might choose to increase their ORDs, particularly in countries that suffer from 
political instability, in order to signal their better performance so as to secure vital resources 
from the external environment.  
Empirically, a few studies (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013;  Elamer et al., 2018; Ernstberger & 
Grüning, 2013; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016) have examined the role of country-level governance in 
promoting ORDs. For example, Barakat and Hussainey (2013) find a positive but insignificant 
relationship between country-level governance in terms of rule of law and ORDs, whilst Tunyi 
and Ntim (2016) find that national governance quality has a positive impact on mergers and 
acquisitions in Africa. On the other hand, using a sample from 16 European countries, 
Ernstberger and Grüning (2013) find that the positive effect of corporate governance on 
disclosure is higher in countries with good national governance quality than in those with poor 
national governance quality. This leads us to hypothesise that: 
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H5: There is a statistically significant relation between country-level governance and the level 
of ORDs in MENA Islamic banks.  
4. Research Design 
4.1. Sample and Data Considerations 
Following recent cross-country studies (Ntim, 2016; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016; Elamer et al., 2017), 
our sample comprises all listed IBs from 10 countries in the Arab MENA region – Bahrain, 
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the UAE – based on 
the Bankscope Database as summarised in Table 3, with full data from 2006 to 2013. Hence, 
our final sample covers 63 banks over eight years, leading to a total of 412 bank-year 
observations for our regression analysis.   
Insert Table 3 about here 
This study uses data from three distinct sources. First, ORDs, SSB characteristics, and CG 
variables were gathered from annual reports, which were downloaded from banks’ websites 
and the Perfect Information Database. Second, financial data were extracted from the 
Bankscope Database. Third, country-level macro statistics and WGI were downloaded from 
the World Bank database. 
4.2. Definition of Variables and Model Specification 
The study’s variables are classified into five main types and Table 4 contains a full description 
of all the variables employed. First, and to examine H1 to H5, the main dependent variable is 
the ORDs’ scores, which measures the level of ORDs.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
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We collect individual operational risk items from the Basel II guidelines and the main 
operational risk disclosure items that are employed in closely related studies (e.g., Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; Helbok & Wagner, 2006; Ntim et al., 2013) to form our ORDs’ index. Hence, 
the ORDs’ index contains 22 provisions as shown in Appendix A1.  
Second, and to test H1 to H5, we collect data on Sharia supervisory boards’ (SSBs’) 
characteristics. We rely on several proxies to capture SSB quality based on closely related 
studies (e.g., Abdullah et al., 2015; Farook et al., 2011; IFSB, 2005; Mallin et al., 2014; 
Rahman & Bukair, 2013). Specifically, SSB characteristics include: (i) SSB Existence (SSBE), 
(ii) SSB Members (SSBM), and (iii) SSB Meetings (SSBT). 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Third, to measure governance structures, the three CG mechanisms (block ownership (BLCK), 
board size (BOSZ), board independence (NEDs)) are used. Fourth, the measure of country-level 
governance (CLG) employed in our regression is a composite measure that includes all 
dimensions of worldwide governance indicators. Previous research shows a high correlation 
between CLG dimensions (e.g., Kaufmann et al., 2011; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016). Hence, we 
employed principal component analysis (PCA) to create a composite measure of CLG and the 
results are shown in Table 5. Table 5 suggests that sampling adequacy for each factor and for 
the whole model is appropriate for statistical analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) that 
measures sampling adequacy is above 0.60 (Tunyi & Ntim, 2016).  
                                                          
1We use two dependent variables: unweighted operational risk disclosures and weighted operational risk disclosure. For the 
un-weighted operational risk disclosures index, each of the 22 items has a score ranging from 0 to 1 (i.e., 0 – operational risk 
item is not disclosed by a bank; 1- operational risk item is disclosed by a bank). This un-weighted scoring procedure can result 
in a total potential score of 22; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%. For the weighted operational risk disclosure index, 
each of the 22 items has a score ranging from 0 to 2 (i.e., 0 – operational risk item not disclosed by a bank; 1 – operational risk 
item disclosed by a bank and contains past, future, good, bad and/or qualitative information; 2- operational risk item disclosed 
by a bank and contains past, future, good, bad, qualitative and/or quantitative information). This weighted scoring procedure 
can result in a total potential score of 44; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%. These ORD items and the scoring procedure 
are contained in Appendix A. 
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Finally, we employ a wide range of bank characteristics as control variables. These include 
bank size (SIZE), performance (ROA), liquidity (LIQ), income diversity (INCD), and 
operations efficiency (COST), as well as macro variables like GCC countries (GCC), financial 
crisis (CRS), inflation (INFL), GDP per capita (GDPC), and dummies for each of the fiscal 
years (YD). We do not develop direct theoretical associations between these variables and 
ORDs for brevity, but a considerable number of prior studies have found that these can affect 
ORDs (Abdallah et al., 2015; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Farook et al., 2011; Ford et al., 2009; 
Helbok & Wagner, 2006). 
We use the panel data fixed effects regression technique, which considers all conceivable 
variations in ORDs due to variations in SSB, CG, and country-level governance over the eight-
year period (Ntim et al., 2013). Additionally, we use the fixed effects model rather than the 
random effects model because Hausman’s specification test rejected random effects in favour 
of fixed effects. Therefore, the model to be estimated is specified as,    
𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑡






                                                                                                                                                 (1) 
where, ORDs is proxy for operational risk disclosures, SSB denotes vector of SSB variables 
which contains SSB existence (SSBE), SSB members (SSBM), and SSB meetings (SSBT). CG 
refers to BLCK, BOSZ, and NEDs. Country-level governance refers to CLG, and CONTROLS 
refers to the control variables, including SIZE, ROA, LIQ, INCD, COST, CRS, GCC, INFL, 
GDPC. δit denotes bank-year specific fixed effect and ε is the error term.  
We present the empirical analyses, including the descriptive statistics, and bivariate and 
multivariate regressions in the following sections. 
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5. Findings and Discussion 
5.1. Descriptive and Correlation Analyses 
Table 6 summarises descriptive statistics of all the variables contained in our analysis, and 
reports a number of remarkable findings. First, it reports that the mean of total operational risk 
disclosures is 11.82 (53.73%) ORDs score. Second, it also reports that there is a large degree 
of variability in the ORDs across different IBs. For example, ORDs range from a minimum of 
0(0.00%) to a maximum of 22 (100%) with a standard deviation of 4.75. Our finding is 
consistent with the prior empirical literature findings (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Mokhtar & 
Mellett , 2013; Ntim et al., 2013; Rahman & Bukair, 2013). The large degree of variation in 
ORDs among IBs may be due to the fact that the ORDs’ index items are voluntary, as well as 
the fact that the variations may reflect differences in country-level governance and institutions’ 
quality. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
Second, Table 6 reports that 31% of Islamic banks do not have SSB.  SSB members (SSBM) 
are between zero and seven with a mean of three members. From the above-mentioned SSB 
statistics, it could be argued that there is a large difference between Islamic banks in the MENA 
region regarding SSB structure and meetings frequency. It also offers support for prior findings 
(AI-Bassam & Ntim, 2016; Farook et al., 2011; Rahman & Bukair, 2013), which indicate that 
SSB structures are primarily poor. 
BOSZ is between five and 15 with an average of nine board members, which is in line with 
OCED and MENA CG codes’ recommended best practice, and consistent with previous studies 
(Mollah & Zaman, 2015; Ntim et al., 2013). NEDs is between 0.00% and 100% with an average 
of 88%, which is considered as an indicator for board independence and in line with OCED 
CG best practice, but interestingly, there are banks that do not have any NEDs, which may 
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result from increased block shareholding. The results are also similar to the prior literature 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Mollah & Zaman, 2015). Also, the mean of block shareholding 
(BLCK) is 53.32%, which is higher compared to the OCED’s CG best practice 
recommendation); the findings are, however, similar to the results of Ntim et al. (2013).  
Table 6 illustrates that country-level governance quality (CLG) in the MENA region is low 
with a mean of 0.33, and ranges from -0.95 to 0.80. In addition, IBs look financially healthy. 
For example, the mean liquidity ratio is 53.41 and most of the IBs in our sample are making a 
profit with a mean profitability ratio of 9%. The values of SIZE, INCD, COST, GCC, INFL and 
GDPC suggest wide variability in our sample, thus reducing any potential of sample selection 
bias. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
Table 7 reports the Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation matrices to test multicollinearities. 
We report both the Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-parametric coefficients. 
Noticeably, the significance and direction of both coefficients are mostly alike, and this shows 
that no severe non-normality problems exist. The correlations between the variables are also 
generally lower than 0.60, implying that there are no serious multicollinearity problems. In 
addition, Table 7 shows statistically significant connections between ORDs and the 
independent variables. For example, and as expected, SSBE, SSBM, SSBT, BLCK, NEDs, CLG, 
SIZE, LIQ, and GCC are statistically significant and positively associated with ORDs, whilst 
BOSZ, ROA, INCD and INFL are statistically significant and negatively related to ORDs. 
Together, the results offers support for past evidence (e.g., AI-Bassam & Ntim, 2016; Barakat 
& Hussainey, 2013; Farook et al., 2011; Mollah & Zaman, 2015). 
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5.2. Regression Analyses 
Table 8 reports the regression analysis results of the impact of SSBs and governance structures 
on ORDs. Generally, the findings show that the SSB, CG and country-level governance 
mechanisms are important in explaining differences in ORDs. First, the coefficients of the SSB 
proxies (i.e., SSBE, SSBM, and SSBT) in Models 1 to 3 of Table 8 are positive and statistically 
significant, implying that IBs with high SSB quality are more likely to make increased 
operational risk disclosures. This implies that SSBs may impose pressure on managers to 
engage in increased ORDs. The positive connection between SSB and ORDs is in line with 
theoretical suggestions that SSB mitigates agency conflicts via serving as additional CG layer 
for monitoring managers, thus resulting in increased disclosures. Our findings similarly offer 
practical support for H1 and previous findings (Farook et al., 2011), which suggest that SSB 
has a positive impact on ORDs. 
Second, the coefficient of BLCK in Models 1 to 3 of Table 8 is positive. Hence, we reject H2. 
This result is consistent with Neifar and Jarboui (2018). This result is inconsistent with the 
findings of Mokhtar and Mellett (2013), and Ntim et al. (2013), which suggest that block 
shareholding is negatively related to risk disclosures. Similarly, Models 1 to 3 of Table 8 
suggest a negative relationship between board size (BOSZ) and ORDs; although this 
relationship is not statistically significant. The negative association between BOSZ and ORDs 
is in line with the findings of Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Arcay and Vazquez (2005) and 
Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010). Thus, we reject H3. Also, Table 8 reports a positive 
and statistically significant association between NEDs and ORDs. This result provides further 
empirical support for agency, signalling, legitimacy, and resource dependence theories and 
previous studies (Neifar & Jarboui, 2018). This implies that the current result seems to reflect 
an additional demand for ORDs by independent boards. Consequently, IBs with large 
independent boards appear to commit to high levels of ORDs in order to mitigate agency costs, 
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and thereby facilitate access to vital resources such as Sukuk, and thus legitimise their 
operations. Hence, we accept H4. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
Third, our results suggest that variances in the ORDs can largely be explained by the country-
level governance (CLG). The coefficient of CLG is significant statistically and positively linked 
to ORDs in Models 1 to 3 of Table 8, and it also provides empirical support for agency, 
signalling, legitimacy and resource dependence theories. This result implies that a better 
governed environment affords better protection for investors. Accordingly, IBs commit to high 
levels of information transparency via increased ORDs in better governed countries compared 
to the case in other countries. Models 1 to 3 of Table 8 report that IBs choose to increase ORDs 
in countries that have high country-level governance quality to signal their performance and 
secure vital resources from the external environment. Hence, we accept H5. This result provides 
an exciting opportunity to advance our knowledge of country-level governance (CLG) and its 
influence on ORDs. 
Fourth, Table 8 reports a positive association between SIZE, LIQ and ORDs, while it shows an 
insignificant relation between ROA, INCD, COST, INFL, GDPC and ORDs. These results in 
general support prior studies’ findings (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013).  
5.3. Robustness Test 
We carry out a number of robustness tests in order to address any potential endogeneity 
problems and sensitivities that may be present in our regression models. First, we test the 
robustness of our ORDs index results by re-regressing equation (1) using weighted ORDs, as 
alternative operational risk disclosure index. The results stated in Models 4 to 6 of Table 8 are 
mostly the same with those results reported in Models 1 to 3 of Table 8 with a slight difference 
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in the significance of the coefficients. Therefore, these findings indicate that our results are 
robust whether the ORDs’ index is un-weighted or weighted.  
Insert Table 9 about here 
Second, to address potential endogeneity problems that may be due to unobserved predictor 
factors’ bias (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013), we use two-stage least 
squares (EC2SLS) for the random effect panel data model. In the first stage, based on extensive 
theoretical and empirical research (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013), we 
conjecture that CG variables (i.e., block ownership, board size, and board independence) and 
SSB will be determined by all the control (exogenous) variables specified in equation (1). In 
the second stage, we employ the predicted values of the CG variables and SSB as an instrument 
for the CG variables and SSB and re-estimate equation (1) as specified below: 
𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ?̂?𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑡






                                                                                                                                                 (2) 
where, everything remains unaffected as identified in equation (2) except that we use 
instrumental variables for CG variables and SSB variables. The results, reported in Model 1 to 
6 of Table 9 are similar to those reported in Models 1 to 6 in Table 8, and thus suggest that our 
findings do not suffer from any potential endogeneity problems. 
 Finally, we estimate equation (2) by employing another econometric methodology to address 
potential endogeneity issues in our model. Islamic banks may consider a need for adjusting 
their quality of operational risk disclosure in response to the riskiness prevailing in their 
banking sector, producing an endogeneity issue in our result. Although we have used the 2SLS 
estimator to allow for endogeneity issues in our estimation, we try to address this potential of 
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reversed causality by alternatively using the dynamic system GMM estimator. We follow the 
approach of prior research (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Elamer et al., 2017; Wintoki et al., 2012) 
by using a dynamic panel regression of the form: 
                 𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼1 +  𝑘1𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿𝑖𝑡 +  𝑖𝑡                                                   (3) 
where ORDs is proxy for operational risk disclosures for bank i during year t. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 denotes all 
explanatory variables that include SSB characteristics, BLCK, BOSZ, NEDs and CLG.  𝑍𝑖𝑡 
refers to SIZE, ROA, LIQ, INCD, COST, CRS, GCC, YD, INFL and GDPC. 𝛿𝑖𝑡 is the 
unobserved bank-year specific fixed-effects, and 𝑖𝑡 is the white noise error term. The 
estimation results on operational risk disclosures, using the two-step system GMM estimator, 
are reported in Table 10. Overall, we find consistent evidence that Sharia supervisory board 
and governance structure are key determinants of the operational risk disclosure in most of the 
regression models. Finally, IBs commit to reporting high levels of information transparency 
via increased ORDs in GCC countries compared to other countries in the MENA region due to 
the fact that, in the last decade, GCC countries have embarked on stronger CG reforms (Al-
Hadi et al., 2016; Al-Malkawi et al., 2014; Dalwai et al., 2015; Elamer, 2017; Shehata, 2015), 
as well as adopting, implementing and enforcing the requirements of IFRS and Basel II and III 
accords (Al-Hadi et al., 2016; Bitar et al., 2016; Dalwai et al., 2015; Elamer et al., 2017; Haque 
& Brown, 2017) compared to their non-GCC counterparts. Future studies may develop non-
parametric techniques such as Neural Networks (Abdou et al., 2019) or/and examine the impact 
SSB on CSR, environmental performance, carbon taxes and Integrated Reporting (IR) (e.g., 
Adhikariparajul et al., 2019; Elmagrhi et al., 2019; McLaughlin et al., 2019).  
6. Summary and Conclusion  
The weaknesses of operational risk management and disclosure practices, as well as corporate 
governance (CG) structures in the wake of the financial crisis have reignited the debate relating 
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to the importance of managing operational risk management and disclosure practices within 
the banking sector worldwide. Therefore, this paper has examined the impact of Sharia 
supervisory boards, bank-level governance mechanisms, and country-level governance 
structures on operational risk disclosures, using a sample of 63 Islamic banks from 10 (i.e., 
Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the UAE) 
countries in the MENA region for fiscal years 2006-2013. Our findings are threefold. First, we 
find that the level of operational risk disclosures (ORDs) in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries is, on average, higher than those of other MENA countries. Second, we find that SSB, 
block ownership, board independence, and a country-level governance quality are statistically 
significant and positively associated with ORDs. Finally, and by contrast, our findings indicate 
that the impact of board size is negative and statistically significant. This paper, therefore, 
extends, as well as makes a number of new contributions to the existing literature. 
First, while operational risk disclosures worldwide consist of a variety of specific disclosures, 
including regulatory capital for operational risk, operational risk management strategies and 
processes, and operational risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques, in our setting where 
Islamic banks in MENA face a unique challenge in managing their risk due to the continual 
political turbulence, distinctive asset and liability structures and Islamic compliance compared 
to conventional commercial banks allows us to emphasise the salient aspect of IBs governance 
structure (i.e., the Sharia supervisory board). Second, this study offers comprehensive evidence 
about the role of bank-level corporate governance mechanisms in determining operational risk 
disclosure levels. Third, we use a unique dataset from Islamic banks in 10 MENA countries, 
where banks’ annual reports are expected to disclose more information related to operational 
risks. A cross-country basis provides the ability to mutually cogitate the role of the bank-level 
governance and that of country-level governance. We, hence, add to the new and emerging 
nascent research regarding the relevance of country-level governance in shaping operational 
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risk disclosure decisions, which in turn, can decrease information asymmetry. Thus, our 
findings have significant implications for regulators, policymakers, shareholders, and 
borrowers and savers, particularly those operating in developing countries, where Islamic 
banking have experienced substantial growth in the past decades.   
The findings support the current regulatory corporate governance reforms that place emphasis 
on the importance of sound risk management along with good corporate governance, disclosure 
and transparency practices in MENA countries. Policymakers and regulators should, therefore, 
undertake a fundamental review of corporate governance codes within the banking sector in 
general with special emphasis on the importance of SSB in Islamic banks. The finding of wide 
differences in the level of ORDs also suggests that some attention needs to be paid by IBs to 
the level of ORDs. One potential recommendation is to implement and enforce a disclosure 
framework, which has been issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which 
encourages ORDs by banks. 
Although our results are robust, there are some limitations that need to be clearly 
acknowledged. First, the ORDs’ data were manually gathered; this involved a great deal of 
time, and hence restricted our focus to a MENA sample of IBs and the combined components 
of ORDs (e.g., Sharia incompliance risk). Future studies may analyse how SSBs and 
governance structure affect components of ORDs with further expansions (e.g., Sharia non-
compliance risk). Second, although the findings obtained by using the unweighted/weighted 
ORDs’ index seem to be principally the same, researchers may improve their investigation by 
using different ORDs’ measures (e.g., pages number/sentences counted). Finally, future 
research may improve their investigation by examining how other CG mechanisms, such as 




Appendix A. Operational risk disclosures index items’ sources 
Disclosure item Reference(s) 
(i) Amount of regulatory capital for 
operational risk (Pillar 1 capital). 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2006, 
2014b, 2015b, 2016; IAS 1.134-135).  
(ii) Regulatory capital for operational risk 
measurement approach. 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2014, 
2014c, 2016). 
(iii) Operational risk management strategies 
and processes. 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2014, 
2015b, 2016; IFRS 7.33; Ntim et al., 2013). 
(iv) The operational risk management 
function structure and organisation. 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2014, 
2015b, 2016; IFRS 7.33; Ntim et al., 2013).  
(v) Scope and nature of the operational risk 
reporting system. 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2014, 
2015b, 2016; IFRS 7.33; Ntim et al., 2013). 
(vi) Operational risk 
transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques. 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2014, 
2015b, 2016; Ntim et al., 2013). 
(vii) Operational value at risk. (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ford et al., 
2009). 
(viii) Internal audit function/internal control 
system. 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2014; 
Helbok & Wagner, 2006; Mokni et al., 2014; 
Ntim et al., 2013; Van Greuning & Iqbal, 
2007). 
(ix) Key risk indicators (KRIs)/early 
warning systems (EWSs). 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2014; 
Ford et al., 2009; Mokni et al., 2014; Young, 
2015). 
(x) Self-assessment techniques (SA). (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ford et al., 2009; 
Young, 2015). 
(xi) Stress tests/scorecard models/scenario 
analyses. 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ford et al., 2009; 
Mokni et al., 2014; Young, 2015). 
(xii) Operational risk event databases 
(internal/external). 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2014; 
Ford et al., 2009; Mokni et al., 2014; Van 
Greuning & Iqbal, 2007; Young, 2015). 
(xiii) Legal risks. (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Helbok & 
Wagner, 2006; Van Greuning & Iqbal, 2007). 
(xiv) Additional information on risk 
exposure and management (e.g., cumulative 
amounts of historical operational losses 
classified by event types and business). 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Van Greuning & 
Iqbal, 2007). 
(xv) Technology/information technology. (Helbok & Wagner, 2006; Ntim et al., 2013; 
Van Greuning & Iqbal, 2007). 




(Ntim et al., 2013; Van Greuning & Iqbal, 
2007). 
(xviii) Competition/ proprietary/ copyright. (Ntim et al., 2013; Van Greuning & Iqbal, 
2007). 
(xix) Personnel (human error, labour 
disputes, loss of/recruiting key employees) 
(Helbok & Wagner, 2006; Ntim et al., 2013; 
Van Greuning & Iqbal, 2007) 
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(xx) Integrity/management and employee 
fraud. 
(Helbok & Wagner, 2006; Ntim et al., 2013; 
Van Greuning & Iqbal, 2007). 
(xxi) Business ethics/corruption. (Ntim et al., 2013; Van Greuning & Iqbal, 
2007). 
(xxii) Disclosures to help users understand 
operational risk. 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2014; 
Ford et al., 2009; Van Greuning & Iqbal, 
2007). 
Total: 22 operational risk disclosure items. 
Procedure of scoring for un-weighted index. 
0: Operational risk item is not disclosed. 
1: Operational risk item is disclosed. 
Procedure of scoring for weighted index 
0: Operational risk item is not disclosed. 
1: Operational risk item disclosed by bank contains qualitative information. 
















“The Group is committed to avoid recognising any 
income generated from non-Islamic sources. 
Accordingly, all non-Islamic income is credited to 
a charity account where the Group uses these 
funds for charitable means. Movements in non-
Islamic funds are shown in the statement of 
sources and uses of charity funds. 
The Group receives interest from deposits placed 
with the Central Bank of Bahrain and other 
incidental or required deposits. These earnings are 
utilised exclusively for charitable purposes and 
amounts to US$ 4 thousand (2012: US$ 1 

















“Our Bank belongs to Al Baraka Banking Group, 
(the Bank’s Principal Investor), as being a Unit of 
the Group which stands as one of the leading 
Banking Entities in the World, abiding by the 
application of the provisions and principles of the 
Islamic Shariá in all of its transactions. 
This is further evidenced by the Organizational 
Structure of the Bank, which embodies a Shariá 
Supervisory Board, directly linked to the Bank’s 
Board of Directors, and consists of three eminent 
Scholars specialized in Islamic Shariá and the 
Islamic financial transactions, and recognized and 
acknowledged for their sound Religious opinions 
(Fatwa) and deeply versed in the Jurisprudence of 
transactions. The Shariá Supervisory Board 
undertake the study and scrutiny of the Contracts 
and the Practical Agreements Forms, the 
Procedural and Technical Manuals together with 
the [Standard] Forms used in the Bank [daily] 
activities, in addition to any innovated products, 
as concerning the Shariá point of view. This Board 
issues Decisions, Recommendations, Religions 
opinions (fatwa) in their final form; its Decisions 















“This operational risk appetite supports effective 
decision making and is central to embedding risk 
management in business decisions and reporting. 
Business units have the primary responsibility for 
identifying, measuring and managing the 
operational risks that are inherent in their 
















controlled through a series of strong internal 
controls and audits, well-defined segregation of 
duties and reporting lines, detailed operational 
manuals and standards. The Operational Risk Unit 
oversees the range of operational risk across the 
Group in accordance with the Operational Risk 
Management Framework. Internal Audit 
independently reviews effectiveness of the 
Group’s internal control and its ability to 
minimize the impact of operational risks” (Bank 







“Information Technology • Process improvements 
to reduce the End of Day IT operations and 
thereby extend the availability hours for 
customers using online channels. 
• Implemented COBIT processes and introduced 
various controls. 
• Renegotiated SLAs and various vendor 
contracts, significantly reducing OPEX costs. 
• Rationalising software licenses by way of 
consolidation. 
• QIB successfully re-certified for ISO 27001 for 
the Information Security in the Alternate Channels 
domain. Also, QIB get PCI DSS certification for 
compliance to regulations related to Cards” (Qatar 
















“Lawsuits filed against the Bank 
 The value of the lawsuits filed against the bank 
(self-constructed) amounted JD 10,348,893 and 
481,993 as of December 31, 2013 and December 
31, 2012 respectively. In addition, the value of the 
lawsuits filed against the bank (joint) amounted 
JD 633,121 and JD 399,720 as of December 31, 
2013 and December 31, 2012 respectively. In the 
opinion of the Bank’s management and attorney, 
consequences incurred by the cases of joint 
investment accounts are booked on the Investment 
Risks Fund. What the Bank may incur will be 
covered from the Bank’s provisions. The Bank 
shall not incur any amounts for the lawsuits filed 
against it (self-constructed)” (Jordan Islamic 
Bank, 2013, p. 151).  
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Table 1: Worldwide governance indicators across MENA countries 
Governance  
Indicators 
Year MENA Bahrain Egypt Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Oman Qatar KSA Syria UAE 
Political Stability  
and Absence of 
Terrorism 
2006 37 32 21 23 57 5 72 76 29 37 77 
2009 38 40 26 32 55 8 74 91 28 28 81 
2013 28 9 7 26 52 6 63 92 34 0 76 
Regulatory Quality 
2006 43 71 37 62 61 48 68 62 52 7 70 
2009 48 74 47 61 56 53 69 73 57 18 66 
2013 44 71 26 56 50 50 67 74 55 0 75 






Table 2: Basel II implementation in the MENA region 






2008 2012 2008 2006 2007 2006 2006 2006 --- 2009 




Table 3: Sample characteristics 
Country Banks Bank obs Percentage 
Bahrain 8 60 14.56% 
Egypt 6 33 8.01% 
Jordan 3 16 3.88% 
Kuwait 6 41 9.95% 
Lebanon 2 16 3.88% 
Oman 4 5 1.21% 
Qatar 8 52 12.62% 
Saudi Arabia 11 84 20.39% 
Syria 1 1 0.24% 
UAE 14 104 25.24% 





Table 4: Summary of definitions and operationalisation of variables 
Variables Definitions and coding 
Panel A: Operational risk disclosure 
ORDs Is the overall operational risk disclosure score determined depending on the index as shown 
in Appendix A, which fairly capture the comparative weights of different operational risk 
categories.  
For the un-weighted operational risk disclosure index, each of the 22 items has a score 
ranging from 0 to 1 (i.e., 0 - operational risk item not disclosed by a bank; 1- operational 
risk item disclosed by a bank). This un-weighted scoring procedure can result in a total 
potential score of 22.  
For the weighted operational risk disclosure index, each of the 22 items has a score ranging 
from 0 to 2 (i.e., 0- operational risk item not disclosed by a bank; 1- operational risk item 
disclosed by a bank and contains past, future, good, bad and/or qualitative information; 2- 
operational risk item disclosed by a bank and contains past, future, good, bad, qualitative 
and/or quantitative information). This weighted scoring procedure can result in a total 
potential score of 44. These ORD items and the scoring procedure are contained in the 
Appendix. 
Panel B: Sharia supervisory board  
SSBE SSB existence is a dummy variable which takes 1, if a bank has SSB board, 0 otherwise 
SSBM SSB’s members is number of the SSB members 
SSBT SSB’s meetings is number of the SSB meetings 
Panel C: Governance variables. 
BLCK Percentage of shareholders holds 5% at least of the full bank ordinary shareholdings. 
BOSZ Number of the bank board of directors. 
NEDs Percentage of non-executive directors to the bank board of directors’ size. 
Panel D: Country-level Governance (CLG) 
CLG Country- level Governance (CLG) is a composite measure based on Kaufmann et al. (2011) 
which calculates the six dimensions of country governance. The six dimensions of country 
governance (CLG) are defined as follows: Voice and accountability (VA), political stability 
(PS), government quality (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (ROL), and control of 
corruption (COC). A higher score means better country governance. 
Panel E: Control variables 
SIZE Bank size measured by natural log of total assets. 
ROA Performance which is measured by return on average assets which are a percentage of net 
income to total asset. 
LIQ Liquidity which is measured by net loans to total assets. 
INCD Income diversity which is percentage of net non-interest income/average earning assets. 
COST  Operations efficiency which is percentage of cost to income.    
CRS 1, for the crisis period (2007-2008), 0 otherwise. 
GCC  1, if a bank in one of GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE), 
0 otherwise. 
YD Dummies for each of the fiscal years 2006-2013. 
INFL Inflation, which is consumer prices (annual %). 





Table 5: PCA (eigenvectors) and diagnostics of the national governance quality dimensions 
Variables Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 Unexplained KMO 
VA 0.1761 0.9789 0.0603 0.0746 -0.0351 -0.0191 0 0.8226 
PS 0.4277 -0.0079 -0.6585 -0.0541 0.599 0.1475 0 0.7523 
GE 0.4545 -0.0665 0.2026 -0.5304 0.0176 -0.6829 0 0.6687 
RQ 0.4194 -0.1108 0.6994 0.1779 0.3931 0.3694 0 0.6309 
ROL 0.4354 -0.1453 -0.1301 0.7551 -0.3065 -0.3291 0 0.6658 
COC 0.4627 -0.0628 -0.125 -0.3292 -0.6255 0.5165 0 0.7950 
Eigenvalue 4.3360 0.9002 0.4162 0.2499 0.0698 0.0280   
Proportion 0.7227 0.1500 0.0694 0.0416 0.0116 0.0047   
KMO        0.7029 
Notes: This table reports the six dimensions of national governance quality indicators (CLG) PCA (eigenvectors). Comp refers 
to component. The six dimensions of national governance quality indicators (CLG) are defined as follows: Voice and 
accountability quality (VA), political stability quality (PSQ), government quality (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law 







Table 6: Summary descriptive statistics of all variables for 412 Islamic bank years 
Variables Mean STD Min Max 
ORD 11.82 4.75 0.00 22.00 
SSBE 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 
SSBM 2.55 1.94 0.00 7.00 
SSBT 5.55 2.74 0.00 18.00 
BLCK 53.32 26.89 0.00 100.00 
BOSZ 9.46 1.73 5.00 15.00 
NEDs 0.88 0.19 0.00 1.00 
CLG 0.33 0.39 -0.95 0.80 
SIZE 16.12 1.49 3.73 21.09 
INCD 0.09 0.21 -0.30 0.46 
ROA 3.82 2.19 -4.30 13.53 
LIQ 53.41 15.74 0.00 79.93 
COST 41.03 38.28 -365.63 284.00 
GCC 0.83 0.37 0.00 1.00 
INFL 4.70 4.11 -4.90 15.10 
GDPC 28384.41 24730.12 1472.60 93714.10 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: operational risk disclosure (ORD), SSB existence (SSBE), SSB 
members (SSBM), SSB meetings (SSBT), block ownership (BLCK), board size (BOSZ), non-executive directors 
(NEDs), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (PS) regulatory quality (RQ), bank size (SIZE), 
performance (ROA), income diversity (INCD), liquidity (LIQ), operations efficiency (COST), Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), inflation (INFL), and GDP per capita (GDPC). Table 4 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 7: Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation matrices of the variables for all 412 Islamic bank years 
Variables ORD SSBE SSBM SSBT BLCK BOSZ NEDs CLG SIZE INCD ROA LIQ COST GCC INFL GDPC 
ORD  1  0.38**  0.38**  0.28**  0.08 -0.15**  0.36**  0.18**  0.29** -0.15**  0.02 0.23** -0.01  0.33** -0.42** -0.03 
SSBE  0.33**  1  0.52**  0.16**  0.01 -0.18**  0.16**  0.22**  0.21** -0.14** -0.01  0.08 -0.05  0.15** -0.18**  0.03 
SSBM  0.38**  0.51**  1  0.36**  0.03 -0.28**  0.10  0.23**  0.09 -0.16** -0.07  0.03  0.07  0.16** -0.20**  0.02 
SSBT  0.28**  0.16**  0.33**  1 -0.02 -0.05  0.13**  0.16**  0.20** -0.12* -0.03  0.04 -0.02  0.07 -0.17**  0.13* 
BLCK  0.11* -0.02 -0.02 -0.04  1  0.13**  0.04  0.01 -0.01  0.01  0.02 -0.01  0.06 -0.32**  0.06 -0.46** 
BOSZ -0.13** -0.18** -0.27** -0.08  0.17**  1  0.03 -0.13**  0.16** -0.05  0.14**  0.11* -0.13** -0.03  0.08 -0.11* 
NEDs  0.26**  0.10*  0.08  0.28** -0.03 -0.05  1  0.08  0.09  0.04  0.01 0.23** -0.08  0.18** -0.23** -0.03 
CLG  0.17**  0.22**  0.24**  0.13**  0.01 -0.12*  0.02  1  0.13** -0.02  0.02 -0.19** -0.12* -0.13**  0.04 -0.14** 
SIZE  0.30**  0.25**  0.12*  0.24** -0.01  0.22**  0.03  0.17**  1 -0.19**  0.20** 0.26** -0.16**  0.26** -0.18**  0.05 
INCD -0.22** -0.12* -0.14** -0.03 -0.09 -0.09  0.20** -0.11** -0.23**  1  0.15** 0.15** -0.03 -0.22**  0.13** -0.13** 
ROA -0.17** -0.05 -0.14**  0.01 -0.05  0.17**  0.02  0.02  0.27**  0.20**  1 0.26** -0.32**  0.13**  0.02  0.12* 
LIQ  0.23**  0.07 -0.01  0.06 -0.11*  0.12*  0.33** -0.11*  0.27**  0.22**  0.25**  1 -0.15**  0.53** -0.11*  0.25** 
COST  0.09 -0.02  0.14** -0.01  0.19** -0.20** -0.01 -0.01 -0.31** -0.12* -0.56** -0.29**  1 -0.08  0.04 -0.21** 
GCC  0.26**  0.15**  0.16**  0.07 -0.35** -0.02  0.16** -0.05  0.31** -0.14**  0.11* 0.52** -0.22**  1 -0.32**  0.42** 
INFL -0.33** -0.14** -0.12* -0.17**  0.10*  0.01 -0.27**  0.13** -0.15**  0.02  0.13** -0.17**  0.04 -0.36**  1  0.08 
GDPC  0.03  0.10*  0.12*  0.16** -0.43** -0.14**  0.13** -0.02  0.11* -0.14**  0.16** 0.28** -0.24**  0.53**  0.09  1 
Notes: The upper right half of the table reports Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whilst the bottom left half of the table presents Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients.  
** and * indicate correlation is significant at the 1%, and 5% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). Variables are defined as follows: operational risk disclosure (ORD), SSB report (SSBR), SSB 
existence (SSBE), SSB members (SSBM), SSB meetings (SSBT), board size (BOSZ), non-executive directors (NEDs), block ownership (BLCK), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 
(PS) regulatory quality (RQ), bank size (SIZE), performance (ROA), income diversity (INCD), liquidity (LIQ), operations efficiency (COST), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), inflation (INFL), 








Table 8: The impact of SSBs and governance structures on ORDs using fixed effect 
regression 
Variables Dependent variable: Unweighted ORDs  Dependent variable: Weighted ORDs 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Islamic Governance (Sharia Supervisory Board) 
SSBE  8.78***     8.66***   
 (0.000)    (0.000)   
SSBM  11.71***    11.12***  
  (0.000)    (0.000)  
SSBT    2.43**     2.22** 
   (0.016)    (0.027) 
Panel B: Governance Structures 
BLCK -0.38  1.03 -0.21   0.01  1.40  0.16 
 (0.702) (0.302) (0.836)  (0.988) (0.162) (0.875) 
BOSZ -1.43 -0.66 -1.49  -1.26 -0.52 -1.30 
 (0.155) (0.511) (0.138)  (0.207) (0.604) (0.195) 
NEDs  1.88*  1.69*  2.67***   1.75*  1.57  2.59** 
 (0.061) (0.091) (0.008)  (0.081) (0.117) (0.010) 
Panel C: Country-level Governance 
CLG  6.18***  5.62***  6.32***   7.02***  6.64***  7.11*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel D: Control Variables 
SIZE  1.38  4.17***  3.10***   1.14  3.81***  2.82*** 
 (0.168) (0.000) (0.002)  (0.257) (0.000) (0.005) 
ROA -1.29 -1.08 -1.04  -1.89* -1.72* -1.60 
 (0.198) (0.283) (0.301)  (0.059) (0.086) (0.110) 
INCD -1.83* -0.89 -2.10**  -1.40 -0.48 -1.71* 
 (0.068) (0.373) (0.037)  (0.162) (0.629) (0.088) 
LIQ  4.09***  2.47**  4.43***   4.15***  2.58**  4.48*** 
 (0.000) (0.014) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) 
COST  0.60  0.86  0.38   0.82  1.07  0.57 
 (0.552) (0.388) (0.705)  (0.414) (0.283) (0.566) 
GCC Omitted Omitted Omitted  Omitted Omitted Omitted 
CRS -4.48*** -3.88*** -4.12***  -4.83*** -4.23*** -4.43*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INFL -0.08  0.65  0.31  -0.38  0.30 -0.01 
 (0.935) (0.519) (0.755)  (0.703) (0.767) (0.990) 
GDPC -1.18 -0.53 -2.20**  -0.25  0.39 -1.30 
 (0.238) (0.594) (0.028)  (0.807) (0.696) (0.195) 
Fixed Effect Year Year Year  Year Year Year 
Clustering Bank Bank Bank  Bank Bank Bank 
Intercept -0.01 -2.39** -1.19  -0.22 -2.53** -1.37 
 (0.989) (0.018) (0.234)  (0.824) (0.012) (0.171) 
F-value 18.52*** 24.96*** 10.55***  18.97*** 24.27*** 11.09*** 
R-squared   0.419    0.493   0.298    0.425   0.486   0.309 
No. of obs.   412    412   412    412   412   412 
Notes: This table reports the t-statistics and P-value (in parentheses) from using fixed effect regression model. This table 
presents the following variables: unweighted/ weighted operational risk disclosure (ORD), SSB existence (SSBE), SSB 
members (SSBM), SSB meetings (SSBT), board size (BOSZ), non-executive directors (NEDs), block ownership (BLCK), 
political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (PS) regulatory quality (RQ), bank size (SIZE), performance (ROA), 
income diversity (INCD), liquidity (LIQ), operations efficiency (COST), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), inflation (INFL), 






Table 9: The impact of SSBs and governance structures on ORDs using 2SLS regression 
Variables Dependent variable: Unweighted ORDs  Dependent variable: Weighted ORDs 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Islamic Governance (Sharia Supervisory Board) 
SSBE  9.08***    9.01***   
 (0.000)    (0.000)   
SSBM  11.93***    11.47***  
  (0.000)    (0.000)  
SSBT    2.65***    2.52** 
   (0.008)    (0.012) 
Panel B: Governance Structures 
BLCK  0.36  1.78*  1.09  0.46 1.85* 1.14 
 (0.720) (0.075) (0.274)  (0.645) (0.064) (0.253) 
BOSZ -1.37 -0.41 -2.19**  -1.43 -0.50 -2.29** 
 (0.170) (0.684) (0.028)  (0.154) (0.619) (0.022) 
NEDs  2.64***  2.59**  2.69***  2.47** 2.43** 2.54** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)  (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) 
Panel C: Country-level Governance 
CLG  2.14**  1.48  2.75***  2.88*** 2.27** 3.53*** 
 (0.032) (0.139) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.023) (0.000) 
Panel D: Control Variables 
SIZE  1.35  3.44***  2.26**  1.17 3.13*** 2.01** 
 (0.178) (0.001) (0.024)  (0.243) (0.002) (0.045) 
ROA -1.55 -1.65* -1.76*  -2.11** -2.25** -2.28** 
 (0.120) (0.099) (0.079)  (0.035) (0.024) (0.023) 
INCD -2.32** -0.84 -2.24**  -1.61 -0.12 -1.58 
 (0.021) (0.402) (0.025)  (0.108) (0.903) (0.114) 
LIQ  4.03***  2.93***  3.70***  3.88*** 2.83*** 3.54*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
COST  0.75  0.36  0.72  1.14 0.73 1.08 
 (0.456) (0.718) (0.470)  (0.253) (0.467) (0.282) 
GCC  0.69  0.72  1.74*  0.26 0.28 1.38 
 (0.490) (0.471) (0.081)  (0.796) (0.779) (0.168) 
CRS -4.02*** -3.69*** -3.51***  -4.41*** -4.09*** -3.82*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INFL -1.15 -0.34 -1.20  -1.37 -0.63 -1.46 
 (0.252) (0.732) (0.231)  (0.171) (0.532) (0.143) 
GDPC -1.34 -0.65 -1.92*  -0.36 0.35 -1.02 
 (0.179) (0.515) (0.055)  (0.719) (0.729) (0.310) 
Fixed Effect Year Year Year  Year Year Year 
Clustering Bank Bank Bank  Bank Bank Bank 
Intercept  0.15 -1.93* -0.26  0.12 -1.87* -0.19 
 (0.878) (0.054) (0.795)  (0.906) (0.062) (0.852) 
 χ² 278.34*** 363.05*** 170.64***  279.81*** 351.21*** 173.54*** 
R-squared   0.412   0.485   0.280  279.81*** 351.21*** 173.54*** 
No. of obs.   0.412   0.485   0.280  0.416 0.477 0.286 
Notes: This table reports the random-effects 2SLS for panel-data regression model (EC2SLS). This table presents the following 
variables: unweighted/ weighted operational risk disclosure (ORD), SSB existence (SSBE), SSB members (SSBM), SSB 
meetings (SSBT), board size (BOSZ), non-executive directors (NEDs), block ownership (BLCK), political stability and absence 
of violence/terrorism (PS) regulatory quality (RQ), bank size (SIZE), performance (ROA), income diversity (INCD), liquidity 
(LIQ), operations efficiency (COST), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), inflation (INFL), and GDP per capita (GDPC). Table 






Table 10: The impact of SSBs and governance structures on ORDs using GMM model 
Variables Dependent variable: Unweighted ORDs  Dependent variable: Weighted ORDs 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Islamic Governance (Sharia Supervisory Board) 
Lag ORDs  12.40***  10.24***  18.80***   13.19***  9.93***  18.57*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SSBE  4.30***     5.32***   
 (0.000)    (0.000)   
SSBM   7.49***     4.48***  
  (0.000)    (0.000)  
SSBT    0.61     1.67 
   (0.546)    (0.101) 
Panel B: Governance Structures 
BLCK  0.07  1.81*  0.64   0.24  0.02  2.16** 
 (0.948) (0.076) (0.525)  (0.808) (0.985) (0.035) 
BOSZ -3.81*** -1.51 -2.70***  -3.80*** -4.83*** -4.42*** 
 (0.000) (0.136) (0.009)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NEDs  2.77***  1.77*  0.80   1.18  2.69***  0.20 
 (0.007) (0.083) (0.427)  (0.241) (0.009) (0.841) 
Panel C: Country-level Governance 
CLG  7.14***  5.85***  7.50***   6.62***  3.38***  6.08*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Panel D: Control Variables 
SIZE  3.52***  2.99***  4.05***   3.22***  3.87***  4.76*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA  0.40  1.36  1.36   1.35  3.08***  3.27*** 
 (0.694) (0.179) (0.178)  (0.183) (0.003) (0.002) 
INCD -0.74 -0.51 -0.92  -1.33 -1.51 -0.37 
 (0.465) (0.162) (0.362)  (0.189) (0.137) (0.710) 
LIQ  5.71***  6.44***  9.47***   5.41***  6.43***  7.99*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
COST  0.11  0.28  2.27**   0.57  0.44  3.00*** 
 (0.917) (0.784) (0.027)  (0.573) (0.659) (0.004) 
GCC  5.08***  7.70***  3.36***   5.79***  5.32***  5.00*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CRS -1.53 -1.81* -0.02  -1.66 -2.10** -0.86 
 (0.131) (0.076) (0.985)  (0.102) (0.040) (0.396) 
INFL -1.41 -1.32 -2.67**  -1.85* -1.04 -1.30 
 (0.164) (0.192) (0.010)  (0.070) (0.302) (0.200) 
GDPC -0.95 -1.80* -0.89  -1.70* -3.06*** -0.54 
 (0.345) (0.077) (0.378)  (0.095) (0.003) (0.592) 
Fixed Effect  Year  Year  Year   Year  Year  Year 
Clustering  Bank  Bank  Bank   Bank  Bank  Bank 
Intercept  2.26**  0.73  3.16***   2.17**  1.68*  3.54*** 
 (0.028) (0.470) (0.002)  (0.034) (0.099) (0.001) 
F-value  3536***  1399***  2428***   2112***  1658***  7067*** 
No. of obs.  353  353  353   353  353  353 
AR(1)-(p-value)  0.000  0.001  0.000   0.001  0.001  0.000 
AR(2)-(p-value)  0.790  0.758  0.250   0.934  0.831  0.450 
Hansen test (p-value)  0.684  0.554  0.622   0.772  0.619  0.689 
Notes: This table reports the two-step GMM model. This table presents the following variables: unweighted/ weighted 
operational risk disclosure (ORD), SSB existence (SSBE), SSB members (SSBM), SSB meetings (SSBT), board size (BOSZ), 
non-executive directors (NEDs), block ownership (BLCK), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (PS) regulatory 
quality (RQ), bank size (SIZE), performance (ROA), income diversity (INCD), liquidity (LIQ), operations efficiency (COST), 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), inflation (INFL), and GDP per capita (GDPC). Table 4 fully defines all the variables used. 
 
